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Deep	  Conventionalism	  about	  Evolutionary	  Groups	  Matthew	  J.	  Barker,	  Concordia	  University	  Joel	  D.	  Velasco,	  California	  Institute	  of	  Technology	  	  Concepts	  of	  evolutionary	  groups	  are	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  concepts	  in	  biology	  and	   its	   philosophy.	   These	   groups	   include	   often-­‐cited	   players	   in	   evolutionary	  processes,	  such	  as	  populations,	  species,	  biological	  races,	  and	  lineages	  of	  various	  sorts.	  In	   a	   broad	   sense,	   certain	   products	   of	   evolution	   are	   also	   considered	   evolutionary	  groups,	  including	  clades	  of	  species,	  of	  populations,	  of	  organisms,	  and	  of	  gene	  families.	  Assumptions	   about	   evolutionary	   groups	   feature	   in	   nearly	   every	   biological	   study,	  whether	   explicitly	   evolutionary,	   molecular,	   or	   otherwise.	   And	   philosophers	   have	  exported	   views	   about	   evolutionary	   groups	   as	   far	   afield	   as	   debates	   about	   how	   we	  should	  organize	  and	  fund	  science	  in	  democratic	  societies.1	  	  	  The	  widespread	  importance	  of	  concepts	  of	  evolutionary	  groups	  helps	  make	  disputes	  about	  them	  important.	  But	  it	  makes	  perhaps	  even	  more	  important	  a	  rare	  consensus.	  The	  consensus	  is	  a	  form	  of	  objectivism	  about	  what	  determines	  which	  collections	  are	  evolutionary	  groups.	  It	  allows	  that	  our	  research	  interests	  may	  help	  determine	  which	  group	  concept	  is	  best	  in	  a	  given	  case.	  But	  it	  says	  that	  on	  any	  single	  prevailing	  group	  concept,	  we	  as	  minded	  agents	  do	  not	  help	   fix	  or	  determine	  which	  candidate	  groups	  are	   indeed	   evolutionary	   groups	   under	   that	   concept;	   instead,	   objective	   facts	   alone	  suffice	   for	   that.	   Although	   a	  mix	   of	   biological,	   chemical,	   psychological,	   physical	   facts	  and	   so	   on	   may	   be	   recognized	   among	   these	   objective	   facts,	   it	   is	   harmless	   in	   this	  
	   2	  
context	   to	   use	   “biological	   facts”	   to	   refer	   them.	   What	   is	   important	   is	   that	   this	   set	  includes	   only	  mind	   independent	   facts.	   It	   excludes	   by	   definition	   those	   facts	   that	   are	  instead	   fully	   or	   partially	   mind	   dependent,	   e.g.,	   facts	   about	   our	   research	   interests,	  perceptual	  abilities,	  general	  values,	  and	  so	  on.	  Given	  these	  terms,	  the	  consensus	  view	  says	  objective	  biological	  facts	  alone	  suffice—we	  as	  minded	  agents	  are	  not	  needed—to	  determine	  whether	  a	  candidate	  group	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  kind	  of	  evolutionary	  group.	  	  	  Explicit	   statements	   of	   objectivism	   about	   evolutionary	   groups	   in	   biology	   literatures	  are	   typically	   each	   about	   one	   or	   another	   specific	   kind	   of	   evolutionary	   group.	   And	  fellow	   biologists	   seldom	   challenge	   these.	   When	   molecular	   phylogeneticists	   and	  developmental	  botanists	  argue	  that	   the	  AGL6-­‐like	   family	  of	  genes	   is	  a	  clade	  that	  has	  existed	  for	  at	   least	  300	  million	  years,	  colleagues	  may	  dispute	  whether	  the	  AGL6-­‐like	  group	  really	  is	  a	  clade.2	  But	  the	  vast	  majority	  on	  either	  side	  of	  any	  such	  dispute	  will	  agree	  that	  it	  is	  the	  biological	  facts	  alone	  that	  determine	  whether	  the	  AGL6-­‐like	  group	  satisfies	  the	  notion	  of	  clade	  that	  they	  all	  (let	  us	  suppose)	  are	  using.	  In	  another	  chapter	  of	   the	   objectivist	   consensus,	   evolutionary	   ecologists	   argue	   that	   many	   a	   biological	  taxon	   has	   objective	   cohesion	   owing	   to	   gene	   flow	   between	   but	   not	   beyond	   the	  populations	   constituting	   it.3	  Again,	   any	   disputes	   about	   this	   will	   very	   probably	   not	  indict	   objectivism.	   Indeed,	   objectivism	   about	   evolutionary	   groups	   is	   typically	   taken	  for	  granted	  without	  explicit	  statement.	  And	  when	  stated,	  authors	  happily	   leave	   it	  as	  an	  assumption.4	  What	  could	  be	  more	  obvious	  than,	  say,	   that	  a	  clade	  of	  plants	  would	  be	  a	  clade	  even	  were	  we	  never	  here	  to	  discover	  that?	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Philosophers	  have	  more	  explicitly	  treated	  or	  adopted	  objectivism	  about	  evolutionary	  groups	   as	   a	   general	   consensus,	   rather	   than	   dwelling	   only	   on	   more	   specific	  objectivisms	   about	   this	   or	   that	   kind	   of	   group.	   For	   example,	   Dupré,	   Ereshefsky,	   and	  Kitcher	   clarify	   that	   their	   respective	   pluralisms	   about	   biological	   classification	   are	  consistent	  with	   objectivism	   about	  many	   kinds	   of	   evolutionary	   groups	   (though	   they	  may	  disagree	  on	  some	  kinds	  of	  groups).5	  But	  their	  discussions	  do	  not	  aim	  for,	  and	  so	  understandably	   do	   not	   provide,	   close	   scrutiny	   or	   detailed	   defense	   of	   objectivism	  about	   evolutionary	   groups.	   The	   basic	   and	   assumed	   idea	   is	   that	   many	   different	  evolutionary	   groups	   are,	   despite	   their	   differences,	   similarly	   objective	   because	   the	  evolutionary	  processes	  that	  involve	  and	  produce	  such	  groups	  operate	  objectively.	  	  	  The	  sway	   the	  consensus	  holds	   in	  both	   local	  chapters	  and	  as	  a	  whole	   is	   remarkable.	  Objectivism	  about	  clades	  lies	  behind	  the	  common	  view	  that	  there	  is	  a	  single	  universal	  tree	  of	  life.	  Objectivism	  about	  taxonomic	  groups	  prevails	  among	  even	  non-­‐objectivists	  about	  taxonomic	  ranks,	  and	  is	  part	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  any	  one	  species	  concept	  univocally	  classifies	   organisms	   (barring	   vagueness)	   despite	   competing	   species	   concepts	  ambiguously	   cross-­‐classifying	   them. 6 	  Authors	   working	   on	   the	   Human	   Genome	  Diversity	   Project	   have	   used	   population	   objectivism	   to	   justify	   decisions	   about	   what	  kind	  of	   informed	   consent	   to	   acquire	   and	  when,	   and	   about	  which	   research	  methods	  and	   data	   to	   use.7	  And	   the	   objectivist	   consensus	   has	   motivated	   attempts	   in	   more	  general	  philosophy	  of	  science	  to	  retain	  a	  form	  of	  scientific	  realism	  despite	  recognizing	  an	   increasing	   number	   of	   ways	   in	   which	   values	   (in	   a	   general	   sense)	   must	   shape	  scientific	  inquiry.8	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  Despite	   its	   dominance,	   we	   will	   argue	   that	   this	   consensus	   is	   mistaken	   because	  objectivism	  about	  many	  and	  perhaps	  all	  commonly	  recognized	  kinds	  of	  evolutionary	  groups	  is	  mistaken.	  This	  paper	  aims	  to	  displace	  the	  consensus	  with	  a	  new	  view,	  Deep	  Conventionalism.	  	  This	   new	   view	   consists	   of	   two	   parts.	   The	   first	   is	   a	   pluralism	   that	   is	   deeper	   than	  familiar	   pluralist	   views	   attributed	   to	   Dupré,	   Kitcher,	   and	   Ereshefsky.	   Unlike	   their	  pluralisms,	  ours	  undermines	  the	  objectivism	  of	  the	  consensus.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  our	  view	   fills	   this	   void	   with	   a	   conventionalism	   that	   applies	   to	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	  evolutionary	   groups.	   This	   conventionalism	   says	   that	   even	   given	  any	   single,	   specific	  evolutionary	   grouping	   concept,	   typically	   something	   more	   than	   the	   objective	  biological	  facts	  must	  determine	  or	  fix	  which	  things	  are	  such	  groups.	  The	  “something	  more”	   is	   a	  mix	  of	   facts	  about	  us.	  The	  mix	   includes	  various	   conventions	  of	  ours,	  but	  also	  our	  research	  interests,	  values,	  abilities,	  and	  so	  on.	  We	  use	  “conventionalism”	  for	  short.	  	  To	   proceed,	   we	   first	   situate	   Deep	   Conventionalism	   among	   related	   views.	   This	  positions	   us	   to	   clarify	   a	   key	   notion	   of	   suppressed	   variables	   and	   the	   deep	   pluralism	  associated	   with	   these.	   We	   then	   undertake	   the	   central	   task	   of	   showing	   how	   such	  variables	  ensure	  that	  our	  view	  holds	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  evolutionary	  grouping	  concepts,	  using	   cohesive	   functional	   units,	   populations,	   and	   clades	   as	   exemplars.	   Finally,	   we	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discuss	   potential	   objections	   and	   highlight	   implications	   for	   a	   range	   of	   important	  positions.	  	   1. Situating	  Deep	  Conventionalism	  What	  is	  an	  evolutionary	  group?	  An	  innocuous	  answer	  is	  that	  an	  evolutionary	  group	  is	  any	   group	   of	   things	   that	   have	   certain	   evolutionarily	   salient	   relations	   that	   set	   them	  apart	   from	   other	   things.	   Exactly	   when	   things	   enjoy	   such	   relations,	   they	   make	   an	  evolutionary	   group	   out	   of	   what	   would	   otherwise	   have	   been,	   from	   an	   evolutionary	  perspective,	  a	  mere	  group	  or	  collection.	  	  	  The	   category	   of	   “evolutionary	   group”	   divides	   into	   distinct	   kinds	   of	   evolutionary	  groups.	   Authors	   recognize	   these	   with	   definitions	   and	   elaborations	   of	   different	  evolutionary	   grouping	   concepts,	   distinguished	   by	   appeal	   to	   different	   evolutionarily	  salient	   relations.	   For	   instance,	   “species”	   is	   said	   to	   name	   one	   kind	   of	   evolutionary	  group,	  and	  “population”	  another.	  Definitions	  of	  the	  species	  concept	  typically	  attempt	  to	   identify	   the	  evolutionarily	   salient	   relations	  between	  organisms	  and/or	  groups	  of	  them	   in	   virtue	   of	   which	   those	   things	   together	   form	   a	   species.	   Definitions	   of	  “population”	   typically	  attempt	  to	   identify	   the	  relations	   in	  virtue	  of	  which	  organisms	  form	  a	  population.	  	  	  Sometimes	  a	  dispute	  about	  a	  group	  concept	  is	  about	  which	  definition	  of	  it	  is	  “correct”,	  “best”	   or	   “legitimate”—about	   which	   identified	   relations	   are	   the	   ones	   that	   make	   a	  group	   a	   species,	   or	   a	   population,	   etc.	   This	   is	   sometimes	   further	   understood	   as	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competition	  between	  more	  specific	  concepts,	  each	  vying	  to	  be	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  broader	   concept	   under	   dispute,	   the	   one	   that	   objectively	   does	   or	   does	   not	   apply	   to	  each	   candidate	   group.	   Someone	  with	   this	   understanding	   sees	   the	  biological	   species	  concept,	  phylogenetic	  species	  concepts,	  and	  ecological	  species	  concepts	  battling	  to	  be	  
the	  objective	  species	  concept.	  	  What	  we	  will	  call	  pluralistic	  objectivism	  is	  an	  increasingly	  popular	  way	  of	  interpreting	  these	  sorts	  of	  disputes	  differently,	  a	  way	  of	  qualifying	  or	  even	  eliminating	  some	  of	  the	  dispute	   in	   each	   case	   while	   still	   conforming	   to	   the	   objectivist	   consensus. 9 	  This	  pluralism	  and	  how	   it	   differs	   from	  our	  own	   is	  most	   easily	   seen	  by	  drawing	   from	   its	  application	  in	  the	  species	  concepts	  literature,	  though	  when	  later	  arguing	  for	  our	  own	  view	   we	   will	   only	   treat	   species	   concepts	   implicitly,	   through	   discussions	   of	   other	  related	  important	  kinds	  of	  evolutionary	  groups.	  	  	  Pluralistic	  objectivism	  has	  two	  noteworthy	  features.	  First,	  it	  claims	  that	  the	  concept	  in	  question	   either	   subsumes	   or	   should	   be	   eliminated	   in	   favor	   of	   two	   or	   more—a	  plurality—of	  finer-­‐grained	  concepts,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  legitimate.	  This	  pluralism	  about	  legitimacy	   allows	   that	   two	   concepts	   thought	   to	   be	   competing	   for	   legitimacy	   are	  instead	   each	   legitimate	   for	   distinct	   purposes.	   For	   example,	   the	   biological	   species	  concept	  is	  said	  to	  be	  legitimate	  (or	  the	  best,	  or	  the	  correct	  concept	  to	  use)	  for	  some	  purposes,	   phylogenetic	   species	   concepts	   for	   others,	   and	   ecological	   ones	   for	   still	  others.	  Our	  interests	  help	  determine	  which	  finer-­‐grained	  concept	  of	  a	  given	  broader	  type	  is	  best	  in	  which	  case.	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  Second,	  pluralistic	  objectivism	  says	  that	  for	  each	  finer-­‐grained	  concept	  it	  is	  objective	  facts	  alone	  that	  suffice	  to	  determine	  how	  a	  set	  of	  things	  divides	  into	  groups	  under	  that	  concept.	   So	   our	   interests	   help	  determine	  which	   of	   these	   concepts	   to	   use	   in	   a	   given	  case,	  but	  the	  objective	  facts	  have	  already	  determined	  what	  the	  groups	  are	  under	  each	  of	  the	  concepts	  our	  interests	  are	  choosing	  between.	  	  	  More	  precisely,	  take	  the	  set	  of	  organisms,	  S,	  consisting	  of	  two	  populations	  of	  organism	  on	  opposites	  sides	  of	  a	  mountain,	  population	  North	  and	  population	  South.	  According	  to	   pluralistic	   objectivism,	   objective	   facts	   suffice	   to	   determine	   whether	   and	   how	   S	  divides	   into	   biological	   species	   groups,	   or	   just	   biological	   groups	   when	   these	   are	  deemed	  objective	  but	   their	   assignment	   to	   the	   species	   rank	   is	  not,	   and	  whether	  and	  how	   it	  divides	   into	  ecological	   species	  groups,	  or	   just	  ecological	  groups.	   Suppose	   the	  pluralistic	   objectivist	   believes	   that	   objective	   facts	   determine	   that	   North	   and	   South	  together	  form	  one	  biological	  species	  group,	  while	  objective	  facts	  also	  determine	  that	  North	   is	  one	  ecological	   species	  group,	  and	  South	  another.	  That	   is,	  one	   finer-­‐grained	  concept	  lumps	  North	  and	  South,	  the	  other	  splits	  them.	  Then,	  in	  (say)	  a	  research	  study	  or	  classification	  project	  involving	  S,	  our	  interests	  enter	  the	  picture,	  helping	  determine	  whether	   it	   is	   best	   or	   legitimate	   for	   us	   to	   recognize	   the	   lumping	   divisions	   of	   the	  biological	   species	   concept,	   or	   the	   splitting	   divisions	   of	   ecological	   ones,	   or	   both,	   or	  neither.	  Independently	  of	  us,	  the	  divisions	  are	  there.	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In	  typical	  empirical	  conditions	  our	  view	  disagrees	  with	  the	  objectivism	  in	  pluralistic	  objectivism.	   There	   are	  many	   ways	   to	   convey	   this,	   with	   some	  ways	   useful	   to	   some	  people	   and	   others	   to	   others.	   Our	   view	   says	   that	   conventions—facts	   about	   our	  interests,	   values,	   abilities,	   and	   so	   on—help	   determine	   not	   only	   which	   concept	   is	  relevant	  or	  legitimate	  in	  a	  given	  case,	  but	  also	  to	  which	  candidate	  groups	  it	  applies	  in	  that	  case.	  Our	  conventions	  are	  needed	  along	  with	  objective	  facts	  to	  fix	  the	  extensions	  of	   evolutionary	   group	   concepts.	   Conventions	   are	   needed	   to	   determine	   whether	   a	  collection	   of	   organisms	   is	   a	   population,	   clade,	   give	   type	   of	   species,	   etc.	   How	  many	  biological	  species	  are	   in	  a	  given	  set	  of	  organisms	  is	  not	   fully	   fixed	  by	  objective	  facts	  across	   all	   research	   contexts;	   in	   some	   research	   contexts	   facts	   about	   us	   pair	   with	  objective	  facts	  to	  give	  one	  count,	  in	  other	  research	  contexts	  they	  pair	  to	  give	  others.	  Conventions	  help	  determine	  not	  only	  significance	  but	  also	  accuracy	  of	  group	  identify	  (and	  associated	  taxonomic)	  claims.	  In	  typical	  empirical	  conditions,	  the	  biological	  facts	  cannot	  determine	  whether	  North	  and	  South	  form	  distinct	  ecological	  species,	  let	  alone	  species	  simpliciter.	  	  As	  we	  will	   clarify	   near	   the	   end	  of	   the	  paper	  when	  discussing	   concept	   splitters,	   our	  conventionalism	   about	   grouping	   concepts,	   including	   finer-­‐grained	   ones,	   should	   not	  motivate	  pluralistic	  objectivists	  to	  simply	  split	  their	  finer-­‐grained	  concepts	  into	  even	  finer-­‐grained	   ones	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   reaffirming	   objectivity	   at	   still	   finer	   conceptual	  levels.	   We	   are	   stuck	   with	   our	   conventionalism	   and	   should	   abandon	   pluralistic	  objectivism.	   Our	   reasoning	   begins	   in	   the	   next	   section	   by	   clarifying	   what	   we	   call	  Indeterminacy	   Pluralism.	   This	   is	   pluralism	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   values	   that	   can	   be	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taken	  by	  the	  suppressed	  variables	  associated	  with	  any	  single	  prevailing	  evolutionary	  grouping	   concept,	   not	   pluralism	   about	   multiple	   concepts	   being	   legitimate.	   To	  understand	  suppressed	  variables,	  we	  start	  with	  a	  non-­‐biological,	   linguistic	  example.	  But	   we	   stress	   that	   this	   is	   only	   to	   intuitively	   convey	   the	   form	   that	   Indeterminacy	  Pluralism	  takes,	  and	  how	  it	  can	  mandate	  conventionalism.	  We	  will	  then	  have	  to	  show	  that	  the	  biological	  cases	  take	  this	  form.	  Distant	  views	  in	  philosophy	  of	  language	  do	  no	  work	  in	  any	  of	  this.	  	  	   2. Suppressed	  Variables	  Suppose	  Charles	  is	  at	  a	  large	  picnic	  with	  much	  of	  Alfred’s	  extended	  family.	  Alfred	  is	  in	  a	   small	   group	   of	   people	   around	   a	   punch	  bowl,	   and	  Charles,	  walking	   towards	   them,	  senses	  that	  the	  small	  group	  is	  not	  enjoying	  the	  live	  country	  music.	  But	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  people	  at	  the	  picnic	  love	  the	  music.	  Charles	  asks,	  “So	  is	  this	  small	  group	  of	  you	  unified	  in	  your	  response	  to	  country	  music?”	  	  	  Alfred	  answers	  “yes.”	  But	  this	  is	  correct	  only	  by	  drawing	  on	  context	  to	  further	  specify	  the	   question.	   Alfred	   gathers	   that	   Charles	   asked	   his	   question	   with	   certain	   kinds	   of	  
responses	  in	  mind,	  and	  certain	  kinds	  of	  country	  music.	  Without	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  choosing	   particular	   values	   for	   these	   variables,	   there	   is	   no	   correct	   answer	   to	   the	  question.	  And	  on	  other	  values	  of	  the	  variables,	  we	  can	  imagine	  that	  the	  relevant	  facts	  ensure	  that	  Alfred’s	  answer	  is	  instead	  not	  correct.	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Take	   the	   case	   in	   which	   the	   small	   punch	   bowl	   group	   includes	   just	   Alfred	   and	   his	  brother	   and	   sister.	   For	   the	   kinds	   of	   response	   variable,	   choose	   the	   “emotional	  response”	   value.	   For	   the	   kinds	   of	   country	   music	   variable,	   choose	   the	   “pop-­‐country	  music”	   value.	  Then,	   given	   facts	   about	  his	   family,	  Alfred	   can	   assure	   you	   that	   he	  was	  correct	  to	  affirm	  that	  the	  small	  punch	  bowl	  group	  is	  unified	  in	  its	  response	  to	  country	  music.	  He	  and	  his	  siblings	  each	  react	  with	  disgust	  to	  pop-­‐country	  music,	  and	  more	  so	  than	  any	  of	  the	  attending	  extended	  family	  does.	  However,	  now	  change	  the	  value	  of	  the	  
kinds	   of	   country	   music	   variable	   to	   “alt-­‐country	   music.”	   Then	   Alfred’s	   affirmative	  answer	   to	  Charles’s	  question	   switches	   to	  not	   correct.	  Alfred	   likes	   alt-­‐country	  music	  and	  his	  brother	  loves	  it.	  But	  his	  sister	  detests	  it,	  more	  than	  any	  people	  in	  the	  extended	  family.	   Changing	   the	   other	   variable,	   from	   “emotional	   response”	   to	   “sensory-­‐motor	  response,”	  may	  also	  make	  Alfred’s	  affirmative	  answer	  incorrect.	  	  	  In	   cases	   like	   the	   picnic	   scenario,	   semantic	   facts	   about	   the	  meaning	   of	   “response	   to	  country	   music”	   leave	   many	   variables	   open.	   Short	   of	   further	   inputs,	   there	   is	   no	  semantic	   fact	   of	   the	  matter	   about	  whether	   the	   kinds	  of	   response	   variable	   takes	   the	  “emotional	   response”	   value	   or	   “sensory-­‐motor	   response”	   value.	   Given	   that	   such	  variables	  do	  often	  get	  fixed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  these	  factual	  shortfalls,	  something	  else	  must	  add	  to	  the	  semantic	  facts	  to	  fix	  the	  variable	  values.	  	  	  In	   the	   picnic	   case,	   that	   “something	   else”	   is	   pretty	   clearly	   our	   conventions	   about	  contextual	   information.	   Suppose	   that	   at	   the	   picnic	   it	   is	   pop-­‐country	   music,	   in	  particular,	   that	   is	  playing	  when	  Charles	  asks	  his	  question.	  Then	  very	  probably,	  both	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he	   and	   Alfred	   have	   in	   mind	   the	   “pop-­‐country	   music”	   value	   of	   the	   kinds	   of	   country	  
music	   variable.	   And	   this	   is	   most	   likely	   because	   both	   of	   them	   are	   following	   a	  reasonable	  convention,	  which	  here	  implies:	   if	   it	   is	  pop-­‐country	  music	  that	  is	  playing	  at	  the	  picnic,	  then	  presume	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  country	  music	  that	  the	  question	  is	  about	  is	  pop-­‐country	   music.	   Indeed,	   it	   seems	   that	   in	   cases	   with	   conditions	   like	   this	   case,	  conventions	  must	  help	  with	  any	  fixing	  of	  variable	  values.	  	  	  The	  relevant	  biological	  variables,	  not	  just	  linguistic	  ones,	  are	  also	  of	  this	  kind	  and	  lead	  to	   similar	   results.	   To	   see	   this,	   first	   consider	   that	   in	   the	   picnic	   case	   we	   have	  Indeterminacy	   Pluralism	   consisting	   in	   two	   conditions.	   One:	   whether	   a	   group	   of	  people	  is	  unified	  in	  its	  response	  to	  country	  music	  depends	  on	  variables	  that	  can	  each	  take	  one	  of	  a	  plurality	  of	  values	  that	  are	  all	   included	  among	  the	  facts.	   In	  fact,	  Alfred	  emotionally	  responds	  to	  alt-­‐country	  music	  in	  one	  way,	  and	  to	  pop-­‐country	  in	  another.	  Two:	  for	  some	  or	  all	  of	  these	  variables	  some	  different	  available	  values	  would	  on	  their	  own	   lead	   to	   incompatible	   results,	   e.g.,	   to	   the	   punch	   bowl	   group	   having	   a	   unified	  response	  on	  some	  variable	  values	  but	  not	  on	  others.	  So	  the	  facts	  independent	  of	  our	  contributions	   leave	   it	   indeterminate	  whether	   the	  punch	  bowl	  group	   is	  unified	   in	   its	  response	   to	   country	   music.	   Given	   that	   indeterminacy	   in	   some	   cases	   like	   this	   is	  overcome,	  our	  contributions	  are	  needed	  to	  make	  up	  those	  indeterminacy	  shortfalls.	  	  	  Analogously	   for	  prevailing	  kinds	  of	  evolutionary	  groups,	   Indeterminacy	  Pluralism	  is	  true	  and	  concerns	  the	  plurality	  of	  values	  that	  are	  available	   for	  variables	  of	  being	  an	  evolutionary	   group	   of	   the	   given	   kind.	   Regardless	   of	  whether	   there	   is	   a	   plurality	   of	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legitimate	  species	  concepts	  as	  familiar	  pluralisms	  claim,	  the	  above	  two	  conditions	  are	  typically	  met	  when	  using	  any	  one	  of	  these	  or	  any	  other	  prevailing	  evolutionary	  group	  concepts.	  And	  again	  we	  must	  make	  up	  this	  shortfall	  conventionally.	  To	  make	  good	  on	  these	  claims,	  the	  next	  three	  sections	  discuss	  prominent	  examples	  of	  forward	  looking	  evolutionary	   groups	   and	   then	   backward	   looking	   evolutionary	   groups;	   for	   brevity,	  general	  objections	  are	  discussed	  after	  these	  sections	  rather	  than	  repeated	  in	  each.	  	   3. Functional	  Units	  and	  Cohesion	  	  Many	   evolutionary	   groups	   are	  what	  Baum	   calls	   “functional	   units”,	   characterized	  by	  “cohesion	   or	   causal	   efficacy”	   that	   allows	   them	   to	   be	   “players”	   or	   forward	   looking	  groups	  in	  ongoing	  evolutionary	  processes	  (op.	  cit.,	  p.	  74).	  Although	  authors,	  including	  Baum,	  typically	  have	  species	  in	  mind	  when	  discussing	  these	  units,	  some	  note	  that	  the	  cohesion	   that	   is	   supposed	   to	   make	   species	   functional	   units	   is	   also	   had	   to	   greater	  degrees	  by	   some	  non-­‐species	  groups,	   such	  as	  populations,	   and	   to	   lesser	  degrees	  by	  other	   non-­‐species	   groups,	   such	   as	   multi-­‐species	   syngameons	   and	   perhaps	   some	  higher	  taxa.10	  We	  dwell	  first	  on	  the	  species	  grade	  of	  this	  cohesion:	  species	  cohesion.	  	  Species	   cohesion	  has	  been	   important	   in	  many	  articulations	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   species	  since	   the	  Modern	   Synthesis.11	  This	   is	   explicit	   in	   some	   species	   concepts,	   such	   as	   the	  evolutionary	  species	  concepts	  of	  Wiley	  and	  Simpson,	  and	   implicit	   in	  others,	   such	  as	  Mayr’s	   biological	   species	   concept.12	  Species	   cohesion	   is	   also	   important	   to	   various	  interventional	  and	  field	  studies,	  e.g.,	  attempts	  to	  explain	  why	  conspecific	  populations	  together	   trace	   a	   distinct	   trajectory	   through	   the	   space	   of	   evolutionary	   pressures,	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including	  various	  forms	  of	  natural	  selection.	  Some	  such	  projects	  attempt	  to	  discover	  and	   mathematically	   represent	   relationships	   between	   effective	   population	   sizes,	  population	  subdivision,	  migration,	  and	  species	  cohesion.	  For	  instance,	  a	  traditionally	  recognized	   relationship	   is	   that	   the	   effective	   number	   of	   migrants,	   Nem,	   from	   one	  population	   to	   another	  must	   be	   ≥	   1	   for	   “maintaining	   species	   cohesion”	   across	   those	  populations.13	  Studies	   of	   evolutionary	   forces	   attempt	   to	   refine	   this	   view.14	  Although	  the	   importance	   of	   species	   cohesion	   and	   similar	   sorts	   of	   functional	   cohesion	   differ	  from	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  clades	  in	  phylogenetics,	  many	  phylogeneticists	  insist	  that	  species	  are	  special	  precisely	  because	  of	  their	  functional	  cohesion.15	  	  	  The	  question	  for	  us	  is	  whether	  species	  cohesion	  is	  a	  conventional	  sort	  of	  unity	  due	  to	  featuring	  suppressed	  variables.	  Only	  recently	  have	  authors	  provided	  the	  clarification	  of	   “species	   cohesion”	   required	   to	   answer	   this.16	  Species	   cohesion	   is	   a	   grade	   of	  evolutionary	   response	   cohesion	   that	   involves	   organisms	  or	  populations	   responding	  similarly	  to	  evolutionary	  pressures.	  Importantly,	  whether	  a	  group	  responds	  in	  such	  a	  way	   depends	   partially	   on	   the	   contrast	   class.	   Take	   a	   collection	   of	   populations.	   It	  manifests	   evolutionary	   response	   cohesion	   exactly	   when	   the	   responses	   of	   its	  populations	   to	   evolutionary	   pressures	   are	   more	   similar	   to	   each	   other	   than	   to	   any	  outside	   the	   collection.	   This	   is	   for	   a	   collection	   to	   be	   exclusive,	   in	   at	   least	   one	   way,	  among	  others.	  Without	  this	  particular	  relativization	  to	  things	  outside	  the	  collection,	  it	  is	  hard	   to	   see	  how	   the	  collection	  could	  have	   the	   cohesion	   that	   is	   supposed	   to	  set	   it	  apart	  from	  other	  things	  –	  give	  it	  functional	  unity.	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Once	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   evolutionary	   response	   cohesion	   distinguishes	   evolutionary	  groups	  that	  we	  call	  functional	  units,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  being	  such	  a	  unit	  depends	  on	  the	   values	   that	   suppressed	   variables	   take.	   These	   are	   variables	   of	   evolutionary	  response	  cohesion.	  Recall	  populations	  North	  and	  South,	  flanking	  the	  mountain.	  They	  will	   face	   many	   evolutionary	   pressures,	   often	   concurrently:	   a	   drought,	   a	   nutrient	  deficiency,	   emergence	   of	   an	   advantageous	   mutation.	   And	   there	   are	   different	  responses	  they	  can	  have	  to	  any	  one	  pressure:	  this	   trait	  declines	   in	   frequency	   in	  one	  population	   and	   increases	   in	   the	   other;	   that	   trait	   increases	   in	   both	   populations.	  Minimally	  then,	  two	  suppressed	  variables	  of	  evolutionary	  response	  cohesion	  (of	  any	  grade)	  that	  can	  take	  many	  values	  are	  which	  evolutionary	  pressures	  and	  which	  aspects	  
of	  response.	  	  	  In	  typical	  cases,	  there	  will	  be	  an	  enormous	  number	  of	  values	  these	  variables	  can	  take	  because	   organisms	   and	   populations	   have	   many	   traits	   and	   face	   many	   evolutionary	  pressures.	   On	   many	   combinations	   of	   these	   values	   the	   two	   mountain	   populations	  would	   count	   as	   having	   evolutionary	   response	   cohesion	  while	   on	  many	  others,	   they	  would	   not.	   Suppose	   that	   in	   each	   population,	   just	   1%	   of	   organisms	   have	   a	   suite	   of	  genes	   that,	   during	   depressed	   humidity,	   contribute	   to	   their	   retaining	   moisture	   far	  better	   than	   the	   other	   99%	   of	   organisms.	   Then	   there	   is	   a	   series	   of	   devastating	  droughts.	  The	  suite	  of	  genes	  increases	  to	  35%	  representation	  in	  both	  populations.	  In	  organisms	   of	   other	   nearby	   populations,	   genes	   involved	   in	   moisture	   retention	   are	  quite	   variable,	   resulting	   in	   no	   pattern	   of	   frequency	   response	   during	   the	   droughts.	  Choosing	   “moisture	   retention	  genes”	   for	   the	  which	  aspects	  of	  response	   variable,	   and	  
	   15	  
“series	   of	   droughts”	   for	   the	  which	  evolutionary	  pressures	   variable,	   along	  with	  many	  other	  values	  of	  these	  variables	  that	  similarly	  relate	  the	  populations,	  would	  count	  the	  two	  mountain	  populations	  as	  having	  associated	  evolutionary	  response	  cohesion.	  The	  responses	  of	  moisture	  retention	  genes	  in	  those	  two	  populations	  are	  more	  similar	  to	  each	  other	  than	  to	  any	  responses	  in	  other	  populations.	  	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   in	   North,	   and	   in	   all	   populations	   nearby	   except	   South,	   a	   new	  sequence	   at	   a	   genetic	   locus	   has	   emerged	   that	   dramatically	   helps	   utilize	   increased	  sunlight	   hours	   for	   energy	   production.	   Spikes	   in	   sunlight	   hours	   accompany	   the	  droughts.	   Selection	   then	   facilitates	   a	   spike	   in	   population	   frequencies	   of	   the	   new	  sunlight	   utilization	   sequence—except	   in	   South,	   which	   does	   not	   yet	   enjoy	   that	  sequence.	   If	   we	   change	   the	   value	   of	   the	   which	   aspects	   of	   response	   variable,	   from	  “water	  retention	  genes,”	  to	  “sunlight	  utilization	  locus”	  plus	  other	  aspects	  of	  response	  that	   similarly	   relate	   all	   the	   populations,	   then	   the	   two	  mountain	   populations	  would	  not	  count	  as	  having	  evolutionary	  response	  cohesion.	  	  	  This	   clarifies	  how	   functional	  units	  distinguished	  by	  evolutionary	   response	  cohesion	  will	   typically	   satisfy	   the	   two	   conditions	   of	   Indeterminacy	   Pluralism.	   To	   help	   verify	  that	  this	  is	  typically	  so,	  most	  any	  study	  of	  population	  differentiation	  will	  do.	  Barbará	  et	  al.	  (op.	  cit.)	  recently	  described	  a	  nice	  model	  for	  studying	  population	  differentiation	  across	  continental	  radiations.	  The	  model	  involves	  populations	  of	  Alcantarea	  species,	  perennial	  plants	  in	  Brazil	  that	  grow	  on	  large	  granite	  outcrops	  (similar	  to	  Ayers	  Rock,	  aka	   Uluru).	   Populations	   in	   these	   species	   made	   a	   useful	   model	   partly	   because	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measurements	   suggested	   that	   factors	   known	   to	   complicate	   some	   population	  differentiation	   studies	   (e.g.,	   populations	   diverging	   markedly	   from	   Hardy-­‐Weinberg	  and	   selection/drift	   equilibriums)	  were	   absent,	   or	   otherwise	  would	  not	   significantly	  distort	  assessments	  of	  these	  populations.	  	  	  Highly	   varied	   traits	   characterized	   organisms	   in	   these	   populations.	   For	   example,	   all	  eight	   microsatellite	   loci	   investigated	   in	   populations	   of	   one	   species,	   Alcantarea	  
imperialis,	  “were	  polymorphic,	  with	  up	  to	  14	  alleles	  per	  locus”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  1985).	  And	  the	  scattering	   of	   populations	   across	   granite	   outcrops	   suggests	   varied	   evolutionary	  pressures	   across	   those	   populations.	   Together	   these	   points	   indicate	   there	   are	  many	  values	   that	   the	   variables	   responses	   to	   evolutionary	   pressures	   and	   which	   aspects	   of	  
response	   will	   take	   across	   the	   studied	   populations	   of	   Alcantarea	   imperialis	   (first	  condition	  of	  Indeterminacy	  Pluralism).	  Also,	  evidence	  suggested	  that	  for	  at	  least	  some	  of	   these	   variables	   some	   different	   available	   values	   would	   on	   their	   own	   lead	   to	  incompatible	  verdicts	  on	  whether	  the	  populations	  of	  the	  Alcantarea	  imperialis	  jointly	  manifest	   the	   species	   grade	   of	   evolutionary	   response	   cohesion	   (second	   condition	   of	  Indeterminacy	   Pluralism).	   Genetic	   distances	   between	   populations	   of	   Alcantarea	  
imperialis,	  for	  example,	  were	  sometimes	  nearly	  as	  large	  as	  between	  that	  species	  and	  another	  Alcantarea	  species	  (ibid.,	  p.	  1986).	  Genetic	  variance,	  too,	  between	  conspecific	  populations	   was	   near	   what	   it	   was	   between	   the	   species	   (ibid.,	   p.	   1988),	   and	   many	  researchers	  believe	   that	   in	  many	  cases	  variance	  between	  conspecific	  populations	   is	  even	   greater	   than	   that	   between	   species.	   These	   statistical	  measures	   of	   distance	   and	  variance	   strongly	   suggest	   that	   many	   particular	   genetic	   responses	   to	   evolutionary	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pressures	   are	   more	   similar	   between	   populations	   of	   distinct	   species	   than	   between	  conspecific	  populations.	  	  	  Generally	   across	   functional	   unit	   candidates,	  many	   of	   the	   biological	   values	   available	  for	   suppressed	   variables	   of	   evolutionary	   response	   cohesion	   would	   count	   the	  candidate	   as	   being	   a	   functional	   unit.	   Many	   other	   available	   biological	   values	   would	  have	   the	  opposite	  result.	  Both	  results	  cannot	  obtain.	  And	  the	  biological	   facts	  do	  not	  choose	  which	  of	  all	  the	  biological	  values	  are	  taken	  by	  the	  variables.	  We	  must	  do	  that.	  Species	   cohesion	  and	  other	  grades	  of	   evolutionary	   response	   cohesion	  are	   therefore	  conventional	   sorts	   of	   unity	   in	   light	   of	   the	   Indeterminacy	   Pluralism	   that	   is	   true	   of	  them.	   This	   entails	   conventionalism	   about	   functional	   units	   distinguished	   by	   such	  cohesion.	  	  	   4. Populations	  and	  Interaction	  Rate	  Exclusivity	  Not	   all	   forward	   looking	   functional	   units	   are	   distinguished	   by	   some	   grade	   of	  evolutionary	  response	  cohesion.	  For	  others,	  it	  is	  how	  they	  causally	  interact	  with	  each	  other,	  rather	  than	  how	  they	  causally	  respond	  to	  shared	  evolutionary	  pressures,	  that	  makes	   them	   functional	   units	   of	   an	   evolutionary	   kind.17	  Populations	   are	   the	   prime	  example.	  	  	  Millstein	   usefully	   compares	   prevailing	   distinct	   population	   concepts	   in	   terms	   of	  permissiveness.18	  Some	   are	   astonishingly	   permissive,	   recognizing	   any	   collection	   of	  organisms	  within	  a	  species	  as	  a	  population	  (ibid.,	  p.	  61).	  For	  our	  purposes	  it	  would	  be	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most	   convincing	   to	   show	   that	   the	   least	   permissive,	   or	   most	   specific,	   population	  concept	   that	   is	   common	   in	   evolutionary	   studies	   features	   Indeterminacy	   Pluralism.	  Millstein,	   following	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   others,	   refines	   the	   definition	   of	   such	   a	   concept.	  Roughly,	  “the	  causal	  interactionist	  population	  concept”	  says	  that	  a	  population	  is	  any	  group	   of	   multiple	   conspecific	   organisms	   that	   is	   the	   largest	   group	   for	   which	   the	  internal	   rates	  of	   survival	  and	  reproduction	   interactions	  are	  much	  higher	  within	   the	  group	  than	  outside	  it	  (ibid.,	  p.	  67).	  	  	  As	   with	   evolutionary	   response	   cohesion,	   the	   evolutionary	   group-­‐making	   property	  that	  this	  definition	  picks	  out	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  unity	  or	  exclusivity	  property.	  It	  is	  relativized	  to	   things	   outside	   candidate	   populations,	   as	   you	  would	   expect	   of	   a	   property	   that	   is	  supposed	  to	  unify	  and	  set	  apart	  a	  group	  from	  other	  things.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  is	  survival	  and	  reproduction	  interaction	  rates	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  distinctive	  between	  group	  members,	   relative	   to	   outsiders.	   Effectively	   these	   interaction	   rates	   are	   to	   be	   greater	  between	  group	  members	  than	  between	  them	  and	  outsiders.	  	  	  This	   property	   also	   features	   Indeterminacy	   Pluralism	  due	   to	   variables	   that	   can	   take	  many	  values,	  some	   large	  sets	  of	  which	  would	  suggest	  a	  group	  has	   the	  property	  and	  other	   large	   sets	   of	   which	  would	   imply	   otherwise.	  We	   find	   these	   variables	   at	  more	  than	  one	  level.	  At	  a	  first	  level,	  there	  is	  a	  variable	  that	  is	  not	  suppressed	  at	  all,	  the	  kind	  
of	   interaction	   variable.	   It	   is	   not	   suppressed	   because	   two	   values	   of	   this	   variable	   –	  “survival	  interaction”	  and	  “reproduction	  interaction”	  –	  are	  explicitly	  referenced	  in	  the	  description	   of	   the	   definitive	   property.	   These	   two	   values	   can	   pull	   in	   opposite	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directions.	   Many	   organisms	   frequently	   interact	   with	   others	   in	   a	   way	   that	   changes	  their	  life	  expectancy	  (e.g.,	  negatively	  in	  the	  case	  of	  direct	  or	  indirect	  competition,	  and	  positively	  in	  the	  case	  of	  cooperation),	  without	  changing	  their	  expected	  reproductive	  output	   (ibid.).	   The	   situation	   escalates	   if	   we	   omit	   the	   stipulated	   restriction	   of	   a	  population	   to	   members	   of	   the	   same	   species,	   as	   Godfrey-­‐Smith	   suggests	   we	   do	   to	  properly	  understand	  natural	  selection,	  and	  as	  one	  must	  (on	  pain	  of	  circularity)	  if	  one	  defines	  “species”	  in	  terms	  of	  populations.19	  Highest	  rates	  of	  reproductive	  interactions	  for	   some	  plant	   in	  my	  garden	  might	   connect	   it	  with	  pollinators	  and	  seed	  dispersers,	  while	   highest	   rates	   of	   survival	   interactions	   might	   connect	   it	   with	   other	   plants	  crowding	  it	  for	  soil	  and	  sun.	  	  	  One	   level	   down	  we	   find	   two	   suppressed	   variables:	  kinds	  of	   survival	   interaction	   and	  
kinds	   of	   reproductive	   interaction.	   These	   can	   take	   several	   values,	   indicated	   when	  Millstein	   notes	   there	   are	   several	   different	   kinds	   of	   survival	   and	   reproductive	  interactions,	  respectively	  (op.	  cit.,	  pp.	  67-­‐68).	  Among	  the	  reproductive	  kind,	  she	  cites	  successful	   matings,	   unsuccessful	   matings,	   and	   different	   offspring	   rearing	   activities.	  Survival	   interactions	   include	   direct	   competition,	   indirect	   competition,	   and	  cooperation.	   Values	   for	   each	   of	   these	   will	   often	   simultaneously	   pull	   in	   opposite	  directions	  with	   respect	   to	   a	   candidate	   group’s	   being	   “interaction	   rate	   exclusive.”	   A	  tree	   in	   Mauro’s	   backyard	   has	   perennially	   poor	   fruit.	   The	   local	   deer	   nearly	   always	  choose	  the	  neighbor’s	  tree	  fruit	  instead.	  Furthermore,	  most	  of	  the	  fruit	  from	  Mauro’s	  tree	   rots	   below	   it,	   leaving	   seeds	   to	   struggle	   for	   the	   little	   light	   penetrating	   through	  other	   crowding	   trees	   of	  Mauro’s.	   The	   struggling	   seeds	   of	  Mauro’s	   tree	   involve	   that	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tree	  in	  frequent	  (unfavorable)	  reproductive	  interactions	  with	  Mauro’s	  other	  trees;	  the	  fruit	  of	   that	   tree	   involve	   it	   in	   frequent	   (unfavorable)	  reproductive	   interactions	  with	  the	   neighbor’s	   tree.	   Many	   organisms	   frequently	   each	   have	   many	   reproductive	  interactions,	   some	   of	   which	   suggest	   connections	   to	   one	   group,	   some	   to	   another,	  others	  to	  another	  still,	  and	  so	  on.	  Likewise	  for	  their	  survival	  interactions.	  	  	  Suppose	  we	   accept	   that	   for	  many	   a	   candidate	   population	   in	   the	  popular	   sense	   that	  Millstein	  refines,	  many	  values	  for	  the	  variables	  we	  have	  discussed	  would	  imply	  that	  the	   candidate	   has	   the	   exclusivity	   or	   unity	   that	  marks	   such	   populations.	   And	  many	  other	  values	  would	  imply	  the	  candidate	  does	  not	  have	  this	  property.	  Then	  we	  again	  have	   Indeterminacy	   Pluralism,	   and	   many	   population	   boundaries	   must	   be	   ones	   we	  help	  fix.	  Populations	  popularly	  conceived	  are	  then	  conventional	  in	  our	  sense.	  	   5. Clades,	  Splitting	  and	  Genealogical	  Exclusivity	  	  In	  many	  areas	  of	  biology	  the	  central	  evolutionary	  grouping	  concept	  is	  that	  of	  a	  clade	  or	  a	  monophyletic	  group.	  Clades	  are	  evolutionary	  groups	  because	  they	  feature	  a	  kind	  of	  evolutionary	  unity	   -­‐	   they	  are	  united	  by	  a	  shared	  common	  ancestry,	  which	  makes	  them	  backward	  looking	  groups.	  Relative	  recency	  of	  common	  ancestry	  often	  explains	  why	  members	  of	  a	  clade	  share	  the	  traits	  that	  they	  do,	  grounds	  a	  variety	  of	  inferences	  about	   the	  past,	   and	  provides	   evidence	   about	  what	  unseen	   traits	   in	  members	  of	   the	  group	   will	   be	   like.	   Such	   features	   make	   clades	   so	   important	   in	   taxonomy	   that	   a	  common	  view	  of	  biological	  taxa	  is	  that	  they	  must	  be	  clades.	  The	  importance	  extends	  far	   beyond	   taxonomy.	   Phylogenetic	   trees	   are	   recognized	   as	   the	   background	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information	  required	  for	  a	  huge	  number	  of	  inferences	  and	  explanations.	  But	  trees	  are	  simply	  a	  representation	  of	  which	  groups	  under	  examination	  form	  clades	  that	  do	  the	  real	   explanatory	   work.	   Essentially	   any	   question	   in	   evolutionary	   biology,	   or	   other	  branches	  of	  biology	  that	  make	  evolutionary	  assumptions,	  depends	  on	  history	  and	  so	  on	  clades.20	  	  	  But	   in	   fact	   there	   is	   no	   single	   “common	   ancestry”	   relationship	   that	   grounds	   clade	  groupings.	   A	   standard	   definition	   of	   “clade”	   is	   that	   it	   is	   some	   species	   and	   all	   of	   its	  descendants.	  Yet	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  at	  all	  which	  groups	  are	  species.	  (Nor	  clear	  if	  there	  are	  any	   species.21)	   Further,	   some	  of	   the	  most	  popular	   views	   about	   species	   require	   that	  they	  are	  clades,	  and	  so	  at	  least	  those	  views	  cannot	  define	  “clade”	  in	  terms	  of	  species.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  it	  is	  now	  common	  to	  see	  clades	  defined	  directly	  in	  terms	  of	  groups	  of	   populations	   or	   organisms	   and	   their	   relationships. 22 	  But	   there	   are	   different,	  incompatible	   ways	   of	   understanding	   the	   history	   of	   populations	   and	   of	   organisms.	  Take	  these	  in	  turn.	  	  Defenses	  of	  phylogenetic	  concepts	  of	  species	  often	  talk	  about	  trees	  of	  populations,	  to	  argue	   that	   all	   taxa	   (including	   species)	   should	   be	   monophyletic	   groups	   of	  populations.23	  That	   is,	   a	   clade	   should	   be	   some	   ancestral	   population	   and	   all	   of	   its	  descendants.	  This	  maneuver	  avoids	  talking	  about	  ancestral	  species,	  and	  avoids	  having	  delineation	  of	  clades	  depend	  on	  delineation	  of	  speciation	  events.	  But	  we	  then	  replace	  the	   avoided	   problem	   with	   the	   problem	   of	   delineating	   populations	   and	   population	  lineage	  splits.	  Velasco	  argues	   that	   lineage	  splits	  are	  context-­‐dependent.24	  One	  rough	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argument	   for	   this	   is	   that	   lineage	  splits	  represent	  a	   loss	  of	  cohesion	  between	  groups	  and	   the	   introduction	   of	   distinct	   evolutionary	   paths.	   However	   for	   certain	   kinds	   of	  traits	   a	   group	  may	   still	   be	   cohesive,	  while	   for	   others,	   the	   very	   same	   group	  may	   be	  broken	  up	  into	  independent	  trajectories.	  Only	  the	  context	  and	  associated	  conventions	  can	   determine	   which	   kinds	   of	   traits	   are	   of	   interest	   and	   so	   must	   help	   determine	  whether	  a	  lineage	  split	  has	  occurred.	  	  The	   history	   of	   populations	   is	   naturally	   “loose”	   in	   a	   way	   that	   allows	   for	   some	  reticulation	   between	   groups.	   The	   very	   idea	   of	   migration	   dictates	   that	   it	   must	   be	  possible	   to	   have	   some	   gene	   flow	   between	   distinct	   populations	   without	   thereby	  collapsing	   them.	  How	  much	  reticulation	   is	   allowed	   is	  precisely	  what	   is	   at	   issue	  and	  what	  drives	  the	  point	  that	  lineage-­‐splitting	  (and	  so	  cladehood)	  is	  context-­‐dependent.	  Grant	   and	  Grant	   talk	   about	  distinct	   clades	  of	  Darwin’s	   finches	   and	  place	   them	  on	  a	  phylogenetic	  tree,	  but	   later	  discuss	  hybridization	  between	  these	  groups.25	  There	  are	  many	   reasons	   to	   treat	   sister	   species	   of	   Darwin’s	   finches	   as	   distinct	   clades.	   But	  whether	   the	   relevant	   lineages	   should	   be	   considered	   separate	   at	   all	   depends	   on	  context	  and	  convention.	  	  	  This	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   history	   of	   organisms,	   because	   for	   some	   purposes,	   in	   some	  contexts,	   we	   want	   to	   be	   strict,	   and	   then	   it	   is	   important	   to	   think	   of	   clades	   as	  genealogically	   exclusive	   groups	   of	   organisms.	   That	   is:	   a	   group	   of	   organisms,	   all	   of	  which	  are	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  each	  other	  than	  to	  any	  organisms	  outside	  the	  group,	  with	   no	   exceptions	   such	   as	   hybrids.	   De	   Queiroz	   and	   Donoghue	   introduced	   this	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concept	  of	   exclusivity	   to	   the	   taxonomic	   literature	   to	   separate	   it	   from	  monophyly	   in	  reticulating	   groups	   (such	   as	   organisms	   within	   a	   single	   species).26	  But	   there	   are	  different	  ways	  of	  understanding	  how	  organisms	  are	  related	  to	  one	  another.	  Baum	  and	  Shaw	   first	   carefully	   spelled	   out	   exclusivity	   in	   terms	   of	   genetic	   concordance,	   but	  Velasco	  defines	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  organismal	  parent-­‐offspring	  relationships.27	  These	  two	  kinds	   of	   group	   are	   incompatible,	  with	   some	  biological	   projects	   concerned	  with	   one	  and	  different	  projects	  the	  other.28	  	  	  Thus	  when	  we	  ask	  whether	  a	  group	  is	  genealogically	  exclusive,	  there	  is	  a	  suppressed	  variable	   that	  we	  might	   call	  kind	  of	  genealogical	  exclusivity.	   It	   can	   take	   (at	   least)	   the	  values	   “recency	  of	   organismal	   common	  ancestry”	  or	   “genetic	   concordance.”	  But	   the	  biology	  alone	  does	  not	  determine	  which	  of	  these	  values	  the	  variable	  takes.	  So	  long	  as	  the	   available	   values	   are	   objectively	   incompatible	   as	   these	   two	   often	   are,	   any	  determination	   of	   whether	   a	   candidate	   group	   is	   genealogically	   exclusive	   is	  determination	  that	  we	  help	  with.	  This	  is	  because	  in	  such	  a	  typical	  case,	  our	  research	  interests,	   conventions,	   and	   so	   on,	   are	   involved	   in	   selecting	   among	   the	   available	  variable	   values.	   These	   contributions	   of	   ours	  must	   help	   select,	   if	   variable	   values	   are	  taken	  at	   all.	  Genealogical	   exclusivity	   is	   therefore	   conventional	   in	  our	  broad	   sense	  –	  determined	   by	   biology	   plus	   by	   us.	   When	   being	   a	   clade	   is	   being	   genealogically	  exclusive,	  we	  also	  help	  determine	  whether	  something	  is	  a	  clade.	  	  We	   do	   not	   always	   want	   our	   understanding	   of	   common	   ancestry	   to	   be	   as	   strict	   as	  genealogical	   exclusivity,	   even	   though	   that	   exclusivity	   represents	   a	   kind	   of	   shared	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ancestry	   that	   can	   ground	   many	   kinds	   of	   inferences.	   After	   all,	   a	   small	   number	   of	  hybrids	  between	  two	  different	  clades	  destroys	  either	  kind	  of	  genealogical	  exclusivity	  just	  described.	  And	  often	  we	  want	   to	  understand	   the	  distribution	  of	   some	   “broader	  level”	  feature	  such	  as	  biogeography,	  in	  which	  case	  it	  seems	  appropriate	  to	  think	  of	  the	  history	  of	  whole	  populations	  as	  determined	  by	  population	  lineage	  splits.	  But	  in	  these	  cases	  conventions	  help	  fix	  the	  variable	  value	  “distinct	  population	  lineage”	  in	  place	  of	  “being	   genealogically	   exclusive.”	   And	  we	   saw	   that	   this	   fixed	   value	   itself	   has	   deeper	  suppressed	   variables,	   because	   population	   splits	   depend	   on	   contexts	   that	   have	  incompatible	  outcomes	  and	  which	  the	  biological	   facts	  alone	  do	  not	  choose	  between.	  So	  at	  multiple	  levels	  there	  is	  Indeterminacy	  Pluralism	  and	  conventionalism.	  	  	  The	  general	   source	  of	   this	   is	   that	  different	  parts	  of	  a	   taxon	  have	  different	  histories.	  Which	  parts	  we	  care	  about	  varies	  across	  contexts.	  Our	  research	  interests	  help	  decide	  between	   the	   looser	   “population	   lineage”	   definition	   of	   clade	   or	   the	   more	   strict	  “genealogical	  exclusive	  group	  of	  organisms”	  idea.	  What	  is	  important	  to	  see	  is	  that	  on	  either	  of	  these	  readings,	  there	  are	  still	  further	  suppressed	  variables	  whose	  objective	  values	   would	   incompatibly	   dictate	   which	   things	   are	   population	   level	   lineages	   or	  which	  organisms	  are	  most	  closely	  related	  to	  each	  other.	  And	  the	  biological	  facts	  leave	  us	  with	  a	  plurality	  of	  possible	  values	  that	  lead	  to	  incompatible	  grouping	  of	  organisms	  into	  clades.	  Further	  details	  are	  needed	  for	  any	  determination	  of	  cladehood.	  	  	  This	  is	  most	  obvious	  in	  extreme	  cases	  like	  Thermotogales.	  While	  much	  of	  the	  group’s	  history	  remains	  uncertain,	  ribosomal	  RNA	  and	  other	  “core”	  operational	  genes	  give	  us	  
	   25	  
strong	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   Thermotogales	   are	   a	   bacterial	   group	   that	   share	   a	  “cellular”	  history	  with	  the	  bacteria	  Aquifilales;	  however,	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  genome	  indicates	  some	  other	  phylogenetic	  position	  –	  including	  many	  genes	  which	  are	  clearly	  of	   archaeal	   origins.29	  Context	   combined	   with	   various	   conventions	   helps	   determine	  whether	  Thermotogales	  is	  a	  clade	  of	  Bacteria,	  a	  clade	  of	  Archaea,	  or	  not	  a	  clade	  at	  all.	  While	  Thermotogales	  is	  among	  the	  most	  extreme	  cases	  we	  know,	  this	  kind	  of	  context	  dependence	   is	   unavoidable.	   There	   is	   then	   is	   no	   unique	   objective	   grouping	   of	  organisms	  into	  clades	  and	  so	  no	  uniquely	  correct	  tree	  of	  life.	  	   6. Lumpers	  and	  Splitters	  For	   splitters,	   those	  with	   a	   preference	   for	   finer-­‐grained	   concepts,	   an	   objection	   now	  quickly	  comes	  to	  mind.	  Just	  as	  Dupré,	  Ereshefsky	  and	  Kitcher	  have	  split	  “species”	  into	  “genealogical	   species”	   and	   “interbreeding	   species”	   and	   others,	   objectivists	   can	   split	  the	  concept	  of	   “clade”	   into	   “population	   level	  clade”	  and	  “organism	   level	  clade”.	  This	  may	   concede	   conventionalism	   about	   “clade”,	   but	   relocates	   objectivism	   to	   the	   finer-­‐grained	  concepts	  that	  the	  splitting	  of	  “clade”	  produces.	  Perhaps	  this	  splitter	  strategy	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  “functional	  cohesive	  unit”	  and	  “population”	  too.	  	  Our	   above	   discussion	   indicates	   that	   the	   “clade”	   splitter’s	   first	   division,	   between	  “population	   level	   clade”	   and	   “organism	   level	   clade,”	   will	   only	   confront	   the	   further	  suppressed	   variables	   we	   have	   uncovered	   for	   each	   of	   these.	   Can	   the	   splitter	   then	  simply	   try	   and	   split	   yet	   again?	   Technically,	   yes.	   But	   consider	   the	   kinds	   of	   concepts	  that	  result:	  
	   26	  
• “population	   level	  clade”	  as	  clarified	  by	  a	  strict-­‐but-­‐not-­‐too-­‐strict	  “with	  <1	  incoming	  migrant	  per	  generation	  per	  population”	  
• “organism	   level	   clade	   as	   defined	   by	   being	   an	   exclusive	   group	   due	   to	  being	  a	  clade	  on	  the	  plurality	  of	  the	  genome	  tree	  with	  respect	  to	  all	  genes	  and	  all	  organisms”	  Putative	  objectivism	  about	   these	   concepts	   faces	   two	  problems.	  The	   first	   is	   that	   key	  components	  of	  these	  are	  also	  conventional.	  It	  is	  doubtful	  that	  biological	  facts	  alone	  fix	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  generation	  or	  a	  migrant,	  for	  example,	  much	  less	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  fix	  what	  counts	  as	  an	  organism	  or	  a	  population.	  	  	  The	   second	   and	   more	   decisive	   problem	   is	   that	   these	   concepts,	   and	   the	   additional	  splitting	   that	   produced	   them,	   are	   theoretical	   dead	   ends.	   These	   concepts	   are	   not	  evolutionary	   grouping	   concepts	   at	   all.	   They	   are	   ad	   hoc	   constructions	   for	   the	   sole	  purpose	   of	   being	   objective	   and	  would	  play	   no	   role	   in	   biological	   theorizing.	   Being	   a	  clade	   is	   important.	   If	  we	  want	  to	  know	  what	  a	  clade	   is,	  we	  should	   focus	  on	  the	  role	  that	  the	  term	  “clade”	  plays	  in	  biological	  theory.	  But	  if	  we	  do	  this,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  being	  a	   clade	   is	   tied	  up	  with	  many	  different	  kinds	  of	  processes,	  patterns,	   and	  methods	  of	  detection,	   and	   is	   fundamentally	   intertwined	   and	   interdefined	  with	   other	   “problem”	  concepts	  like	  lineage,	  species,	  and	  population.	  Being	  overly	  precise	  in	  defining	  “clade”	  robs	  the	  term	  of	  its	  power	  to	  play	  the	  large	  number	  of	  roles	  that	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  play.	  	  	  This	  problem	  is	  even	  clearer	  for	  splitting	  “functional	  cohesive	  unit,”	  which	  would	  give	  way	  to	  concepts	  such	  as:	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• “functionally	  cohesive	  group	  with	  respect	  to	  trait	  T1	  and	  pressure	  P1”	  	  
• “functionally	  cohesive	  group	  with	  respect	  to	  trait	  T2	  and	  pressure	  P2,”	  and...	  	  	  If	  one	  of	  these	  applies	  to	  a	  group,	   it	  will	  typically	  apply	  to	  only	  that	  group—the	  one	  featuring	  T1	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  P1,	  for	  example.	  Such	  concepts	  do	  not	  pick	  out	  kinds	  to	  which	   many	   member	   groups	   belong	   and	   over	   which	   theoretically	   interesting	  generalizations	   and	   predictions	   hold.	   Splitting	   “population”	   yields	   similarly	   vapid	  concepts:	  
• “population	  due	  to	  rate	  exclusivity	  with	  respect	  to	  survival	  interactions	  S1	  and	  reproductive	  interactions	  R1”	  
• “population	  due	  to	  rate	  exclusivity	  with	  respect	  to	  survival	  interactions	  S2	  and	  reproductive	  interactions	  R2”	  The	   theoretical	   reasons	   for	  caring	  about	   the	  kinds	  of	  groups	  we	  have	   focused	  on	   in	  this	   paper	   are	   absent	   for	   those	   produced	   when	   avoiding	   our	   conventionalism	   by	  splitting.	   Better	   to	   not	   split	   and	   retain	   conventional	   concepts	   that	   are	   theoretically	  important.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   utility	   of	   evolutionary	   group	   concepts	   depends	   on	  their	  flexibility	  in	  application.	  Empirical	  facts	  about	  the	  organization	  and	  diversity	  of	  the	   biological	   world	   dictate	   that	   our	   grouping	   concepts	   allow	   for	   flexibility	   in	  application	  in	  distinct	  contexts.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  conclude	  that	  this	  diversity	  requires	   instead	   a	   tremendous	   explosion	   in	   the	   number	   of	   evolutionary	   grouping	  concepts	  that	  we	  must	  use.	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Lumpers	  will	  agree	   that	  splitting	  buys	  objectivity	  at	   too	  high	  a	   theoretical	  cost,	  and	  that	  we	  should	  retain	  instead	  the	  theoretically	  important	  concepts	  we	  have	  analyzed.	  But	   many	   lumpers	   will	   keep	   their	   agreement	   with	   us	   short,	   insisting	   that	   these	  unsplit	   concepts	   can	   objectively	   apply	   with	   theoretical	   significance	   across	   many	  contexts.	   For	   example,	   of	   course	   we	   would	   allow	   that	   in	   one	   context	   a	   group	   of	  populations	  is	  a	  functional	  cohesive	  unit	  if	  all	  their	  trait	  responses	  to	  all	  evolutionary	  pressures	   are	   more	   similar	   to	   each	   other	   than	   to	   any	   other	   populations.	   But	   the	  lumper	  argues	   that	  we	  also	  need	   to	  allow	   that	  a	  different	  group	  of	  populations	   can	  have	  the	  same	  property	  of	  being	  a	  functional	  cohesive	  unit	  with	  just	  80%	  of	  their	  trait	  responses	  to	  all	  evolutionary	  pressures	  being	  more	  similar	  to	  each	  other	  than	  to	  any	  other	  population.	  In	  another	  context,	  75%	  may	  suffice	  if	  this	  includes	  the	  right	  traits.	  In	   still	   others	   the	  difference	  may	   concern	  percentage	  of	   pressures	   instead	  of	   traits,	  but	   we	   still	   have	   a	   cohesive	   functional	   unit.	   We	   may	   need	   to	   recognize	   similar	  flexibility	  to	  being	  a	  population:	  in	  one	  context,	  exclusivity	  with	  respect	  to	  large	  sets	  or	  certain	  reproductive	  and	  survival	  interactions	  suffices,	  in	  another	  a	  smaller	  set	  of	  a	  different	  but	  especially	  salient	  mating	  interactions	  is	  enough.	  Perhaps	  a	  similar	  kind	  of	   consideration	   could	   apply	   to	   the	   different	   kinds	   of	   genealogical	   connections	  relevant	  to	  being	  a	  clade.	  	  Effectively,	   these	   suggestions	   indicate	   that	   the	   unsplit	   concepts	   of	   “functional	  cohesive	  unit,”	  Millstein’s	   “population”	  and	   “clade”	  are	  all	   cluster	  concepts.30	  This	   is	  regardless	   of	   whether	   a	   particular	   group	   that	   one	   of	   these	   concepts	   picks	   out	   is	   a	  natural	  kind,	  an	  individual,	  or	  something	  else—in	  each	  case,	  the	  concepts	  are	  defined	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by	   disjunctive	   clusters	   of	   conditions;	   no	   one	   of	   these	   conditions	   is	   necessary	   for	  application	  of	  the	  concept,	  but	  a	  variety	  of	  combinations	  of	  them	  is	  each	  sufficient.	  	  	  There	   are	   two	   candidate	  ways	   to	   claim	  biological	   facts	   alone	  determine	  when	   such	  concepts	   apply.	   One	   is	   by	   putatively	   objective	   weighting	   schemes.	   Such	   a	   scheme	  hopes	  to	  tell	  us	  how	  much	  different	  factors	  matter	  in	  different	  cases.	  Notice	  that	  the	  weighting	   scheme	   that	   says	   that	   all	   factors	   matter	   equally	   across	   all	   cases	   in	   all	  contexts	  is	  still	  a	  weighting	  scheme	  (it	  is	  a	  strictly	  equitable	  one).	  The	  problem	  with	  any	   of	   these	   schemes	   is	   not	   that	   they	   are	   hopeless;	   they	   can	   be	   quite	   useful.	   The	  problem	   is	   for	   an	   objectivist	   reading	   of	   them.	   Thinking	   that	   biological	   facts	   alone	  determine	  which	  traits	  matter	  to	  what	  degree	  in	  what	  context	  is	  hopeless.	  Using	  the	  language	  of	  suppressed	  variables,	  our	  arguments	  in	  this	  paper	  have	  already	  implied	  these	  weightings	  are	  conventionally	  determined.	  	  	  This	   fact	   inspires	   the	   second	   candidate	   way	   to	   claim	   that	   biological	   facts	   alone	  determine	  when	   cluster	   concepts	   apply	   in	   particular	   cases.	   The	   idea	   is	   that	   cluster	  grouping	  concepts	  cannot	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  relative	  similarities	  or	  kinds	  of	  interactions	   between	   things	   that	   groups	   comprise.	   Granted,	   the	   disjunctive	  specifications	  of	  conditions	  above	  may	  be	  epistemic	  guides—they	  may	  help	   indicate	  whether	  a	  given	  concept	  applies	  to	  a	  group.	  But	  these	  conditions	  obtaining	  between	  things	   grouped	   are	   not	   what	  makes	   those	   groups	   evolutionary	   ones.	   Instead,	   the	  groups	  themselves	  have	  ontological	  priority	  as	  real	  units,	  whether	  as	  individuals	  (the	  populations	   of	   Millstein)	   or	   natural	   kinds	   (the	   species	   taxa	   of	   Boyd,	   op.	   cit.,	   and	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Wilson,	  Barker	  and	  Brigandt,	  op.	  cit.).	  Reductive	  definitions	  of	  them	  are	  then	  bound	  to	  fail	  and	  the	  ontologies	  of	  evolutionary	  groups	  resist	  deeper	  specification.	  	  	  This	  “groups	  first”	  view	  may	  seem	  a	  desperate	  way	  for	  the	  objectivist	  lumper	  to	  avoid	  the	  conventionalism	  of	  weighting	  schemes.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  difficult	  view	  to	  refute.	  We	  think	  it	   becomes	   more	   plausible	   when	   elements	   of	   it	   are	   retained	   in	   a	   conventionalist	  framework.	   In	   that	   framework,	  we	   appeal	   to	   biological	   facts,	   but	   also	   draw	   on	   our	  research	   interests,	   abilities,	   values,	   and	   so	   on,	   to	   conventionally	   determine	   which	  things	  are	  evolutionary	  individuals	  or	  kinds.	  Indeed,	  the	  least	  strained	  descriptions	  of	  biological	  practice	  accord	  with	  this.	  After	  conventional	  “group	  first”	  delineations	  pick	  out	   the	   groups,	   epistemically	   useful	   cluster	   specifications	   can	   be	   given	   and	   explain	  why	   these	   groups,	   rather	   than	   other	   possible	   groupings,	   fall	   under	   the	   relevant	  concept.	  	   7. Conclusion	  and	  Broader	  Issue	  Our	  chief	  conclusion	  is	  that	  evolutionary	  grouping	  concepts,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  clades,	  functional	   cohesive	   units,	   and	  populations,	   do	   not	   objectively	   delineate	   groups,	   but	  rather,	  when	  they	  do	  apply	  to	  some	  collection	  or	  organisms,	  they	  must	  do	  so	  with	  the	  help	   of	   our	   conventions.	   More	   specifically,	   facts	   about	   the	   context	   and	   our	  conventions,	   interests,	   and	   values	   combine	   with	   the	   biological	   facts	   to	   determine	  whether	   some	   collection	   of	   organisms	   is	   a	   group	   of	   a	   particular	   kind.	   The	   central	  reason	   for	   this	   concerns	   the	   suppressed	   variables	   built	   into	   these	   concepts.	   The	  concepts	   apply	   only	  when	   the	   variables	   take	   values.	   But	   the	   variables	   cannot	   take	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values	   independently	  of	  context.	  And	  without	  our	  conventions	  helping	  to	  determine	  which	  values	  are	  taken,	  there	  is	  simply	  no	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  about	  which	  collections	  are	   groups	   according	   to	   that	   concept.	   	   For	   just	   a	   flavor	   of	   how	   this	   conclusion	   is	  relevant	  not	  only	  to	  discussions	  of	  evolutionary	  groups,	  but	  also	  connects	  to	  a	  range	  of	  other	  issues,	  we	  finish	  with	  snapshots	  of	  broader	  implications.	  	  	  The	   common	   assumption	   that	   the	   evolutionary	   groups	   we	   study	   form	   objectively	  determined	  branches	  on	  a	  single	  objective	  tree	  of	  all	  life	  is	  false.	  Prevailing	  taxonomic	  concepts	  each	  do	  not	  unambiguously	  divide	  sets	  of	  organisms	  into	  taxa	  when	  taking	  only	  objective	  biological	  facts	  as	  inputs.	  Instead,	  in	  different	  contexts,	  different	  groups	  are	  properly	  regarded	  as	  taxa.	  	  Biological	   taxonomies	   have	   featured	   as	   case	   studies	   in	   broad	   “science	   and	   values”	  debates	  about	  whether	  and	  how	  our	  conventions	  and	  interests	  do	  or	  must	  attach	  to	  such	  taxonomies.	  Some	  objectivists	  concede	  that	  our	  conventions	  and	  interests	  help	  determine	   the	   significance	   of	   taxonomies,	   but	   we	   now	   see	   this	   is	   not	   a	   sufficient	  concession.	   Conventions	   and	   interests	   also	   help	   determine	   the	   accuracy	   of	   those	  taxonomies,	  because	  conventions	  and	  interests	  help	  fix	  the	  groups	  taxonomized.	  	  	  Objectivity	   of	   evolutionary	   groups	   is	   often	   thought	   to	   contribute	   to	   or	   feature	   as	   a	  part	   of	   policy	   justifications.	   For	   instance,	   to	   help	   justify	   the	   conservation	  of	   certain	  caribou	   groups,	   the	   Committee	   on	   the	   Status	   of	   Endangered	   Wildlife	   in	   Canada	  (COSEWIC)	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  appealing	  to	  normative	  principles	  of	  the	  following	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sort:	   if	   a	   described	   group	   of	   organisms	   objectively	   satisfies	   the	   definition	   of	   an	  evolutionary	  group	  concept	  (even	  a	  definition	  arbitrarily	  chosen	  among	  competitors),	  then	   the	   group	   is	   a	   unit	   of	   diversity	   that	   should	   be	   protected	   or	   conserved	   when	  endangered. 31 	  Even	   though	   the	   justification	   of	   this	   principle	   will	   probably	   be	  normative,	  it	  applies	  to	  any	  given	  group	  only	  if	  that	  group	  is	  objective.	  Policy	  makers,	  including	   COSEWIC,	   often	   suggest	   that	   the	   only	   or	  main	   obstacle	   to	   satisfying	   this	  objectivity	   condition	   on	   the	   application	   of	   the	   normative	   principle	   is	   a	   lack	   of	  empirical	   data	   (ibid.,	   p.	   9).	   But	   our	   conclusion	   implies	   the	   obstacle	   is	   greater—that	  the	  objectivity	  condition	  cannot	  be	  met,	  nor	  the	  principle	  applied,	  no	  matter	  the	  state	  of	  empirical	  data.	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